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1、<p><b> 中文3300字</b></p><p> Developing a Venture Capital Industry</p><p> The economic success of Silicon Valley has not gone unnoticed in other parts of the globe. Governmen
2、ts across the world look enviously at the region and try to imitate its economic structure. Because of the central role venture capitalists play in the entrepreneurial process, the development of a venture capital indust
3、ry has become a focus for these governments. Yet little is known about how countries could replicate the complex infrastructure that supports such an industry. </p><p> Modern venture capital originated in
4、the United States in the 1950s and is most evolved in Silicon Valley. Several European and East Asia countries have developed their own venture capital industries, although they look markedly different from those in the
5、United States. Even the definition of venture capital varies widely across countries. </p><p> Financial Market Structure </p><p> Probably the most frequently mentioned obstacle to developing
6、 a venture capital industry is the absence of a liquid initial public offering (IPO) market, which can provide venture capitalists with an exit mechanism to harvest their successful investments. The United Kingdom has a
7、relatively well-developed IPO market that supports the largest venture capital industry in Europe. And since the introduction of the Neuer Markt, Germany has witnessed a dramatic increase in venture capital. </p>
8、<p> How can countries promote the development of a stock market segment that serves young entrepreneurial companies? Germany’s experience suggests that regulations should not be relaxed uniformly. Instead, listin
9、g criteria should be adapted to the needs of entrepreneurial companies, and disclosure requirements should remain rigorous, to ensure investor confidence. There is, however, some question about the relative importance of
10、 stock markets. First, venture capitalists often seem to be able to subs</p><p> Clearly, a venture capital industry needs investors willing to invest in high-risk, high-return assets. In the United States
11、the largest demand for this class of assets comes from large institutional investors. Outside the United States banks tend to be the industry’s largest funding sources. But as incumbent financial institutions, banks may
12、not have the right incentives and capabilities to develop venture capital markets. Banks in the United States play a small and conservative role in venture</p><p> Human Resource Availability </p>&l
13、t;p> Venture capital can only thrive with an adequate supply of entrepreneurs. Whether people in a particular country want to become entrepreneurs depends on such factors as the country’s entrepreneurial tradition, t
14、he social recognition of the entrepreneur, the flexibility of the employment system and social safety net, and the security of jobs in large corporations. The Japanese employment system, for example, is considered relati
15、vely inhospitable to entrepreneurship. A bright Japanese engineer wou</p><p> In addition to entrepreneurs, the venture capital industry needs skilled venture capitalists. The rewards and prestige of being
16、a venture capitalist will affect the quality of work and the quality of people who decide to become venture capitalists. Consider the difference between an independent venture capital firm, where a general partner makes
17、decisions, and a “captive” venture capital firm that belong to an established corporationor bank, where a salaried employee makes decisions. The salari</p><p> Availability of human capital is also critica
18、l for the growth of new firms. In Silicon Valley most of the successful companies are run not by their original founders, but by experienced professional managers. Moreover, the ability of entrepreneurial companies to at
19、tract workers at all skill levels―for example, by offering stock options―is crucial. Silicon Valley, where the scarcest resource is talent, not money, has seen a remarkable cultural shift. In business schools thirty yea
20、rs ago the most</p><p> Source of Opportunities </p><p> The availability of opportunities—the basis of creating a good deal flow—is related to a number of factors: </p><p> * H
21、ow good is the technology and research environment? </p><p> * Are there channels of communication between research and industry that allow for commercialization of new technological research? </p>
22、<p> * How accessible are domestic markets to entrepreneurs? </p><p> * How easy it to set up a firm in the first place? </p><p> * Is regulation predictable enough that entrepren
23、eurial opportunities are not converted into opportunities for holdup by bureaucrats and other powerful agents? </p><p> Supporting Institutions </p><p> Silicon Valley has a rich array of firm
24、s and professionals that specialize in tasks that benefit entrepreneurs―lawyers, accountants, consultants, subcontractors, head hunters, public relations firms, and so on. In addition, Silicon Valley’s environment is sai
25、d to be particularly fluid, based on networking among decentralized actors rather than more centralized mechanisms. Other countries do not have this level of specialized support services because such specialization only
26、pays with a vibrant e</p><p> Government Policy </p><p> Through policy choices the government affects the size and structure of the venture capital industry. Government actions fall into thr
27、ee broad categories. First, the government can have a creative function. In Singapore, for example, the venture capital industry is the result of a series of promotional measures taken by the government. Virtually every
28、government has some program of subsidies or other help to small enterprises. Second, government policies such as tax policies and regulations of v</p><p> Concrete policy questions include the appropriate l
29、evel of the capital gains tax and the kind of programs the government might use to encourage entrepreneurial activity. The happy venture capitalist diagram is meant to provide an organizing framework for developing a lis
30、t of other topics and questions. </p><p> Other, more fundamental questions relate less to specific policy than to the process of government promotion of venture capital, as exemplified by three interrelat
31、ed policy dilemmas. The first concerns comparative advantages. Good opportunities abound in most economies, but these opportunities typically look very different from those in the United States. While highly developed ec
32、onomies in Western Europe and East Asia may have comparative advantages in some fields of high technology, many less-</p><p> The second dilemma is whether government action is appropriate in the first plac
33、e. Many in Silicon Valley believe that their economic success was achieved without the government. This assertion is partly unfounded rhetoric that ignores the many dimensions of government. For example, the demand for t
34、echnology products often came first from government agencies, especially the Department of Defense. The Small Business Investment Companies Program of the Small Business Administration was critical to</p><p>
35、; The third dilemma concerns the private actors at the core of the development effort. Should domestic actors promote a domestic venture capital industry? Or should venture capital be imported from the United States? If
36、 aspiring young venture capitalists decide to import venture capital from the United States, should they invite established global venture capital firms or more focused players dedicated to their particular countries? An
37、other intriguing idea is the use of expatriate networks. The de</p><p> The success of the Internet has awakened the entrepreneurial ambitions of people across the globe in a way that is probably unpreceden
38、ted in history. Venture capital seems to be a critical component in developing entrepreneurial activity. But we cannot look at the development of venture capital in isolation. The rise of venture capital and the Internet
39、 pose both a challenge and an opportunity for developing and developed countries to redefine their policies concerning the development not only of</p><p><b> 發(fā)展風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資業(yè)</b></p><p> 硅谷
40、經(jīng)濟(jì)的成功的努力一直都在全球其他地方的視野中。世界各國(guó)政府羨慕地觀察著此地區(qū),并嘗試模仿其經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)。由于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的核心作用在創(chuàng)業(yè)過(guò)程中發(fā)揮,一個(gè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資業(yè)的發(fā)展已成為這些國(guó)家政府的重點(diǎn)。然而很少有人知道國(guó)家如何效仿支持這樣一個(gè)產(chǎn)業(yè)的復(fù)雜的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。</p><p> 現(xiàn)代風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資起源于美國(guó)在20世紀(jì)50年代,最早在硅谷發(fā)展起來(lái)。一些歐洲和東亞國(guó)家已發(fā)展了自己的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資行業(yè),盡管它們看起來(lái)明顯和美國(guó)不同。即使是風(fēng)
41、險(xiǎn)資本的定義在各國(guó)差異也很大。</p><p> 什么樣的條件是一個(gè)活躍的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本市場(chǎng)的要求?本文對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資及相關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)的發(fā)展問(wèn)題提出一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的框架結(jié)構(gòu)。該框架是基于對(duì)硅谷和一些曾試圖發(fā)展自己的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資行業(yè)的國(guó)家以及發(fā)展中國(guó)家和發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家在提升自己國(guó)內(nèi)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資經(jīng)常遇到的問(wèn)題的研究。</p><p><b> 金融市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)</b></p><p>
42、; 發(fā)展風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資業(yè)可能最經(jīng)常提到的一個(gè)障礙,是一個(gè)流動(dòng)性的首次公開(kāi)募股(IPO)市場(chǎng),它可以提供一個(gè)在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家的收獲成功投資的情況下的退出機(jī)制。英國(guó)有一個(gè)相對(duì)發(fā)達(dá)的IPO市場(chǎng),支持在歐洲最大的創(chuàng)業(yè)資本行業(yè)。通過(guò)諾伊爾市場(chǎng)的引入,在德國(guó)已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本急劇增加。</p><p> 各國(guó)應(yīng)如何推動(dòng)股市細(xì)分市場(chǎng)服務(wù)青年創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的發(fā)展呢?德國(guó)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)表明,不應(yīng)該放寬一致的規(guī)定。相反,上市標(biāo)準(zhǔn)應(yīng)適應(yīng)創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的需要,并
43、應(yīng)保持嚴(yán)格的披露要求,以確保投資者的信心。然而,有一些關(guān)于股市的相對(duì)重要性的問(wèn)題。首先,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家往往似乎能夠替代收購(gòu)(交易銷(xiāo)售)的首次公開(kāi)招股獲得流動(dòng)資金。也許更重要的是,證劵交易商自動(dòng)報(bào)價(jià)系統(tǒng)(納斯達(dá)克)全國(guó)協(xié)會(huì),已經(jīng)有效地提供了對(duì)在其他國(guó)家投資者的退出選擇,如以色列。這表明了國(guó)內(nèi)股票市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展可能并不總是最優(yōu)先考慮。</p><p> 顯然,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本行業(yè)需要投資者愿意投資于高風(fēng)險(xiǎn),高回報(bào)的資產(chǎn)。在美國(guó)對(duì)這
44、類(lèi)資產(chǎn)類(lèi)最大的需求來(lái)自于大型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者。美國(guó)以外的銀行往往是該行業(yè)最大的資金來(lái)源。但正如現(xiàn)任金融機(jī)構(gòu),銀行可能沒(méi)有正確的激勵(lì)和能力發(fā)展風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本市場(chǎng)。美國(guó)的銀行在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資中企業(yè)的資本小,又比較保守,特別是回避早期的真實(shí)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)交易。盡管在其他國(guó)家中銀行發(fā)揮了更加積極的作用,股票市場(chǎng)仍占美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的主導(dǎo)地位。例如在德國(guó),銀行積極推動(dòng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資。這些努力在很大程度上是一場(chǎng)災(zāi)難,但是,產(chǎn)生的經(jīng)濟(jì)損失以及對(duì)著個(gè)概念的人的可信性產(chǎn)生了懷疑。</p&g
45、t;<p><b> 人力資源可用性</b></p><p> 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資只友在企業(yè)家的充足供應(yīng)下才能興旺。無(wú)論是在哪一個(gè)特定國(guó)家的人想成為企業(yè)家都依賴于國(guó)家的企業(yè)傳統(tǒng),企業(yè)家的社會(huì)認(rèn)同,對(duì)就業(yè)制度和社會(huì)安全網(wǎng)的靈活性,以及在大公司的職位安全等因素而定。例如,日本的就業(yè)制度被認(rèn)為是比較荒涼的企業(yè)家精神。一個(gè)有才能的的日本工程師就不僅要放棄終生的職業(yè)來(lái)創(chuàng)業(yè),而且在為新公司招聘員
46、工也有相當(dāng)大的困難,將很難獲得啟動(dòng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)社會(huì)認(rèn)同,并可能面臨在相當(dāng)大的故障的情況下尋找新的工作時(shí)面臨更大的困難。相比之下,在為創(chuàng)業(yè)公司工作的臺(tái)灣的年輕工程師則可獲得可觀的工作的威信。</p><p> 除了企業(yè)家,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資業(yè)需要熟練有才能的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家?;貓?bào)與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家的威信可以影響工作的質(zhì)量和人們決定誰(shuí)將成為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家??紤]之間的一個(gè)獨(dú)立風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司,其中普通合伙人分別作出決定,而“俘虜”的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司,屬于既定
47、的合作銀行,其中受薪雇員作出決定。對(duì)大公司的受薪雇員,不可能履行作為一個(gè)資金雄厚的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資基金,允許豐厚的利潤(rùn)分享(百分之二十是在硅谷的普通合伙人同樣的質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的工作)。圈養(yǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本基金經(jīng)理人不太可能制訂相應(yīng)的心態(tài),成為良好的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家。在日本和德國(guó)為例,大銀行使用他們的正式員工來(lái)運(yùn)行它們的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本的運(yùn)作。這些員工的行為更像風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家而不是傳統(tǒng)保守的銀行家。他們認(rèn)為他們的職業(yè)生涯的興趣是避免損失,而不是采取重大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。 </p>
48、;<p> 人力資本的匱乏也為新企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)的關(guān)鍵。在硅谷絕大多數(shù)成功的公司并不是通過(guò)他們的創(chuàng)始人來(lái)運(yùn)行管理的,而是由經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的職業(yè)經(jīng)理人。此外,創(chuàng)業(yè)公司能夠吸引所有工人技能水平的能力是是至關(guān)重要的,例如,通過(guò)提供股票期權(quán)。在硅谷稀缺的資源是人才而不是金錢(qián),這已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)了顯著的文化上的轉(zhuǎn)變。在30年前的商學(xué)院最搶手的是工商管理碩士后,工作在工業(yè)。 15年前,人們希望的是從事咨詢和投資銀行業(yè)務(wù)。今天,最優(yōu)秀的學(xué)生希望成為創(chuàng)業(yè)資本
49、家或企業(yè)家。對(duì)許多國(guó)家人們是否想成為企業(yè)家或創(chuàng)業(yè)資本家的相關(guān)問(wèn)題可能不會(huì)那么大,最終有才華的人會(huì)這樣做。</p><p><b> 機(jī)會(huì)的源泉</b></p><p> 可用的機(jī)會(huì),創(chuàng)造一個(gè)良好的交易量,是與多種因素相關(guān):</p><p> *技術(shù)和研究環(huán)境怎樣?</p><p> *是否在研究和為新技術(shù)的研究商
50、業(yè)化行業(yè)之間有溝通的渠道?</p><p> *企業(yè)家是如何進(jìn)入國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)?</p><p> *如何輕松建立在一個(gè)堅(jiān)實(shí)的首位?</p><p> *監(jiān)管是否足夠明確,創(chuàng)業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)并不轉(zhuǎn)化為強(qiáng)大的官僚和其他代理人含率轉(zhuǎn)換的機(jī)會(huì)?</p><p><b> 支持機(jī)構(gòu)</b></p><p> 硅
51、谷擁有一系列豐富的企業(yè)和專(zhuān)業(yè)人士,主要任務(wù)是使工作有利于企業(yè)家,律師,會(huì)計(jì)師,顧問(wèn),獵頭,公關(guān)公司等。此外,硅谷的環(huán)境被認(rèn)為是特別流體,基于網(wǎng)絡(luò)的行動(dòng)者之間的分散,而不是更多的集中機(jī)制。其他國(guó)家也沒(méi)有這方面的專(zhuān)業(yè)支援服務(wù)的專(zhuān)業(yè)化水平,因?yàn)橹挥羞@樣一個(gè)充滿活力的企業(yè)部門(mén)才能支付。動(dòng)態(tài)可自我加強(qiáng):即在硅谷的創(chuàng)業(yè)行業(yè)的增長(zhǎng)創(chuàng)造了專(zhuān)門(mén)的支援服務(wù),從而促進(jìn)更多的創(chuàng)業(yè)公司形成的出現(xiàn)。有關(guān)的問(wèn)題是如何促進(jìn)互補(bǔ)機(jī)構(gòu)這個(gè)復(fù)雜的系統(tǒng)開(kāi)發(fā)。</p>
52、;<p><b> 政府政策</b></p><p> 政府通過(guò)政策選擇的影響大小和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資行業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)。政府的行動(dòng)可分為三大類(lèi)。首先,政府可以有創(chuàng)造性的功能。在新加坡,例如,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資業(yè)是一個(gè)由政府采取一系列宣傳措施的結(jié)果。幾乎每一個(gè)政府具有一定的補(bǔ)貼或其他幫助小企業(yè)的方案。第二,如稅收政策和創(chuàng)業(yè)投資的法規(guī),直接影響到政府的政策風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本行業(yè)。第三,法律和規(guī)章養(yǎng)老基金,股票市場(chǎng),
53、勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng),專(zhuān)利和其他領(lǐng)域的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資業(yè)的影響間接。 具體的政策問(wèn)題,包括資本收益稅和方案,政府可能使用一種鼓勵(lì)創(chuàng)業(yè)活動(dòng)的適當(dāng)水平。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家的幸福圖,是為了提供一個(gè)發(fā)展的其他議題和問(wèn)題清單的組織框架。 其他的,更根本的問(wèn)題涉及少,而不是具體政策的政府促進(jìn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本的過(guò)程中,由三個(gè)相互關(guān)聯(lián)的政策困境就是例證。第一個(gè)問(wèn)題的比較優(yōu)勢(shì)。良好的機(jī)會(huì)比比皆是,大多數(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)體,但這些機(jī)會(huì)通??雌饋?lái)非常來(lái)
54、自美國(guó)的不同。而高度發(fā)達(dá)的西歐和東亞經(jīng)濟(jì)體可能在一些高科技領(lǐng)域的比較優(yōu)勢(shì),許多不發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家少的行業(yè)吸引風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本。印度,例如,在第一次接受外包在信息技術(shù)世俗和勞動(dòng)密集的任務(wù),但它作為一個(gè)平臺(tái),以開(kāi)發(fā)新的技能這些活動(dòng),逐步走上了如軟件開(kāi)發(fā),以高附加值的任務(wù)。并不是每一個(gè)國(guó)家都不會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)它</p><p> 互聯(lián)網(wǎng)的成功,喚醒了世界各地的方式,可能是歷史上前所未有的人的創(chuàng)業(yè)雄心。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本似乎是在發(fā)展創(chuàng)業(yè)活動(dòng)的重要組成部分
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